Kim Jong Un Death Disinformation
Kim Jong Un death rumors have been circulating since the initial report by DailyNK that KJU was recovering from heart surgery at Hyang San Villa. These rumors have taken a life of their own as some news outlets (I’m looking at you TMZ) decided to include KJU’s death in their headlines, even while acknowledging they had no confirmation within the article. This has caused a flurry of activity on the Internet as people opine upon the possible death of the portly dictator. But, as I wrote before, I’m not convinced that KJU has died at this time. However, Kim’s extended absence from public appearances (especially from Kumsusan and during the KPRA anniversary) does make me wonder what’s going on. So, I will put forward a possible assessment of what KJU is doing at this time with the caveat that anything is possible at this point. Nobody outside of the DPRK elite know where Kim is.
An Historical Precedence
On 17 November 1986, rumors indicated that Kim Il Sung was shot and killed on a train. The media reported that loudspeakers on the DMZ announced the leader’s assassination followed by the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces O Jin U’s seizure of power. Reporting indicated that initial loudspeaker broadcasts stated that the whole country was behind Kim Jong Il as the new leader before announcing that the whole country was supporting O Jin U. Meanwhile, the United Nations Command never confirmed reports of these announcements and none of the broadcasts were recorded. Further, DPRK diplomatic officials claimed that all of these reports were baseless at the time.
The reports of Kim Il Sung’s death were proven to be false the next day on 18 November as he greeted a Mongolian delegation at the Pyongyang International Airport. This revelation caused criticism to be levied on the ROK government for incompetence in reporting that the leader had died. Opposition party legislators called for the ruling party to resign en masse and President Chun’s administration suffered a serious embarrassment during a tumultuous time. Moreover, O Jin U continued in his role as Minister of the People’s Armed Forces until his death nine years later in 1995. Interestingly, KJU is reported to have purged the sons of O Jin U in 2017 during his consolidation of power.
Possible Disinformation Operation
My assessment of the current events is that it is likely that reports of KJU’s death are a disinformation campaign similar to the 1986 event. These reports are based on the single DailyNK source and a HK-based source, which the international media have spread like wildfire. Similarly, the 1986 event was spread due to a Tokyo-based source and an uncorroborated report from the DMZ that the DPRK leader was killed. The 1986 event was likely executed to gauge US and ROK reactions to the death of Kim Il Sung. In this same vein, I expect that this current event is both a test of US ROK reactions as well as a possible test of the DPRK elite.
Rodong Sinmun published photos of Kim Jae Ryong, Premier of the DPRK, conducting unit inspections on 25 April. This date has significance in the DPRK as the anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army — Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla army. Assuming that KJU is incapacitated, then this may serve as an attempt to bolster support for Kim Jae Ryong as opposed to nominal head of state Choe Ryong Hae. In addition to being the President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, Choe Ryong Hae is possibly the father-in-law of KJU’s sister, Kim Yo Jong. Regardless, Kim Jae Ryong conducting this guidance on an historically significant day absent a KJU appearance is interesting, especially while these rumors are circulating. Also, reports of the DPRK assessing its security posture last year lead me to conclude that the Kim regime is operating within a heightened environment of paranoia. This would have been further expanded with recent high-level defections and the election of Thae Yong Ho.
Therefore, it seems logical to me that KJU would plant the idea of him suffering a catastrophic event into the minds of the international media. In turn, the media reported that KJU and his inner circle were gathered at Hyang San Villa, presenting a perfect opportunity for a decapitation strike. KJU could then wait and see if any actions were executed during this time. Also, KJU could monitor the actions of the DPRK elite assuming that they were unaware of this ploy. If this is the case, then I would predict that further purges in the DPRK are forthcoming.
Conclusion
At this point nobody knows what’s really going on in the DPRK. KJU has been absent for the birthday of his grandfather, the anniversary of his first visit to Russia, and the anniversary of the founding of this grandfather’s guerrilla army. Meanwhile, the Premier of the DPRK has been seen in public offering on-the-spot guidance. Also, the US and the ROK governments have downplayed reports of KJU’s possible death or incapacitation as a result of health complications. It also seems that Trump’s mention of a “nice letter” from Kim may have been a tactic aimed at eliciting a response from the North. Given the above context, my assessment remains that this is likely a disinformation operation targeting the US, ROK, and the DPRK elite. I expect we will see reports of purges following Kim’s return to public life.
