Ironclad US-ROK Alliance
The ROK held an inter-Korean railway ceremony to celebrate the second anniversary of the Moon-Kim summit at Panmunjom. One of the key agreements to emerge from that summit was an agreement to reestablish inter-Korean railways on the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. The South Koreans held the ceremony at Jejin Station, the terminal point of over 100 kilometers of new rail planned to be laid beginning next year at a cost of over $2 billion. ROK Transportation Minister Kim Hyun Mee indicated that this section of rail will serve as the starting point of an inter-Korean railway, though no DPRK officials were present.
President Moon indicated on the same day that the ROK will not idly sit by while waiting for US-DPRK negotiations to rekindle. Instead, he stated that the ROK will “explore the most realistic and practical ways for South-North cooperation.” Given the new super-majority that the ruling party enjoys, we are seeing the beginnings of an administration confident in executing its DPRK policy in its final years. I do not expect this to end well for the US-ROK alliance.
The US and the ROK are currently engaged in negotiations over cost-sharing provisions in the new Special Measures Agreement (SMA). Amidst these negotiations, leftist news organizations in the ROK are calling on the Moon administration to resist US efforts aimed at convincing Seoul to increase its share of USFK costs. Additionally, the ROKG has indicated that it will pay 70% of wages of furloughed USFK workers and reimburse that cost on the back-end when negotiations conclude. Thus, the South Koreans believe they have the ability to hold firm during these talks, especially considering the domestic political considerations of the Trump Administration during an election year.
While US-ROK relations have been taking a hit over the last few months, the ROKG has consistently attempted to improve relations with the DPRK. Hankyoreh has called on Pyongyang to embrace inter-Korean efforts and ROK officials have made clear that they will pursue inter-Korean projects “while taking into account the possibility of violating the international sanctions in the process.” Meanwhile, the ROK continues to use the comfort women, IJA conscripts, and forced laborer issues to attack Japan within the ROK court system. The KCNA has also reported on Hankyoreh articles detailing actions in these lawsuits. Of note, the ROKG has not issued any meaningful statements on the DPRK’s use of forced labor, conscripts, or sexual abuse.
US ROK Splits
US national security interests primarily face threats from the DPRK and the PRC in the Northeast Asia region. And while the ROK and Japan have served as important partners for US security interests in the region, the ROK is increasingly becoming an unwilling participant. And rather than invest in maintaining this relationship, the US appears to be taking actions that go counter to the National Security Strategy. The NSS indicates
Sustaining favorable balances of power will require a strong commitment and close cooperation with allies and partners because allies and partners magnify U.S. power and extend U.S. influence.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
While I agree with the Trump Administration that the ROK is no longer a developing nation and is more than capable of covering its fair share of costs under the SMA, the heavy-handed approach has caused the South Koreans to dig in. Further, President Trump’s recent comments claiming to know how KJU is doing have caused opposition lawmakers to press Moon Administration officials in the ROK.
President Trump has a history of making off the cuff comments that force those in his periphery to scramble for explanations. And while the Moon Administration may not be overtly hostile to the US, repeatedly backing it into a corner will only serve to further strain US-ROK relations. At this juncture, the Trump Administration should be working with the ROK to build political capital for the fights we need to have, not wasting standing and alienating the opposition in the ROK.
The US as an Offshore Balancer
Recently, a USAF B-1B flew a sortie from Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota to Japan via the Bering Sea and the North Pacific Ocean.
The bomber flew in formation with Japanese fighters before returning to Ellsworth AFB. This came after the Pentagon announced an end to the Continuous Bomber Presence mission in accordance with the updated national security strategy. Clearly, the US is signalling its ability to continue to project force without having to remain forward deployed in the Indo-Pacific. However, the US should be careful not to give indications that total abandonment is in the cards.
ROK-PRC Relations
In 2015, former President Park Geun Hye attended a PRC military parade to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II. And after the PRC expressed its anger with the ROK over the THAAD deployment, President Moon visited the PRC calling for “a new era” in ROK-PRC relations. Since then, the Moon Administration has pursued closer relations with the PRC to the point of receiving criticism for mishandling the COVID-19 outbreak on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party. The ROK’s largest trading partner, in both exports and imports, is the PRC. Moreover, the ROK sees a significant percentage of its tourists, foreign students, and foreign workers as coming from the PRC. Consequently, the economic benefits of good relations with the PRC are great for the ROK. However, this further erodes the US-ROK alliance as the US finds itself increasingly forced to face a belligerent adversary, the CCP.
The opposition party in the ROK views US-PRC relations with skepticism, and the US must empower this bloc to maintain pressure on the ROKG. Therefore, my assessment is that the US should work to conclude the current round of SMA negotiations as soon as possible and work to maintain good relations with the ROK. Although the current administration is somewhat ambivalent towards the alliance, we have weathered the storm before through the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations.
Lee Nak Yeon as the Next President
The next POTROK will be elected on 9 March 2022. At this time, all indications point to former Prime Minister Lee Nak Yeon (who won election to the National Assembly in the 15 April elections) as being the likely nominee for the Minjoo Party. Lee began his career as a reporter for Dong A Ilbo, eventually becoming chief of the world news section, before entering politics as an Assemblyman from South Jeolla Province and then governor of South Jeolla Province. In 2017, Lee was tapped as Prime Minister by President Moon and joined the administration to fulfill this administrative role.
Lee’s entrance into politics was encouraged by former president Kim Dae Jung, and Lee served as a spokesperson for the former president Roh Moo Hyun. Also, as governor of South Jeolla Province Lee oversaw progressive policies, which President Moon sought to implement nationwide. Thus, the progressive bona-fides of Lee Nak yeon are without question, and his possible election would serve as a continuation of Sunshine Policy 2.0.
One area of possible improvement under a President Lee would be ROK-Japan relations. In October of 2019, then Prime Minister Lee attended Emperor Naruhito’s enthronement and agreed with Prime Minister Abe that ROK-Japan relations cannot continue to remain strained. And, while Lee indicated that the forced laborer issue was not resolved by the Claims Settlement Agreement of 1965, he gave hope for returning ROK-Japan relations to the status quo of separating historical issues from security cooperation and economic issues.
Lee has relations with Japanese officials built during his time as a Tokyo special correspondent for Dong A Ilbo and as a vice chairman of the Korea-Japan Parliamentary Friendship Association. Lee’s competence in international relations and knowledge of foreign events would be a strength that President Moon does not have. So, while a Lee Administration would be a continuance of Moon’s progressive policies, he would likely be a stronger partner in the US-ROK alliance. Of course, things could change in the next two years and we may be looking at a possible President Hwang Kyo Ahn (though I doubt that).
Conclusion
I believe that a major redeployment of US troops from the Korean Peninsula will be necessary in the near future. However, the US must approach this in a gradual fashion and cannot be perceived as unilaterally abandoning our “blood ally.” In turn, the ROK seems to be headed on a course for increased attempts to improve relations with the DPRK and the PRC. The US must resist PRC attempts to gain greater soft power in the region and must continuously highlight the human rights abuses that the North Koreans execute against the Korean people. To achieve this end, the US must work with South Koreans who share liberal democratic values by avoiding actions that damage the national pride of the ROK as a whole. Also, more resources should be spent on developing relationships with agents within the entire Korean Peninsula and on information operations that target the region. The ROK will prove to be an important partner in countering the rise of China, and the US must preserve the concept of “같이 갑시다” to this end.
